The visit of Nigeria’s President on a reported 3-day State Visit to France has raised many interesting headlines in France: “Le Nigéria, un partenaire africain choyé par Emmanuel Macron (https://search.app/oznfcpVMYHhGxHPa7); TV5MONDE says ‘Après le Ghanéen Nana Akufo-Addo mi-novembre, le Nigérian Bola Ahmed Tinubu est attendu cette semaine chez son ‘ami’ Emmanuel Macron (Https://search.app/xJftzgDexkLRrifK8); Libération newspaper of 28 November says “France-Nigéria: un partenariat d’égal à égal…, etc.
The first headline considers Nigeria of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu (PBAT) as a partner who is ‘choyé.’ Choyé can mean a commune in the Haute-Saône department of Bourgogne-Franche-Comte in eastern France. Interrogatively put, is the commune expected to play host to PBAT? This first meaning is not applicable because the programme of PBAT’s reception talks about Paris only. Choyé can also refer to being pampered or cosseted or spoiled, that is, President Emmanuel Macron is pampering PBAT. This meaning rightly reflects the reality because the second headline says PBAT is expected this week in the house of his ‘ami’ (friend). If PBAT is seen as a friend of Emmanuel Macron and the Libération is talking about partnership based on peer-to-peer or equal footing, pampering cannot but be the case.
However, in spite of the pampering and the high level character of the visit, Nigeria-France relations has generally been fraught with a bedlam driven by mutual suspicions since 1960. Most notably, the politico-economic relationship is dichotomised as France always differentiated between political and economic interests in her relationship with Nigeria. France can disagree with Nigeria on political questions but disallows disagreement at the level of economic interests. Consequently, the amitié (friendship) between Macron and Tinubu is only promoted at the level of bilateral life (officious or unofficial) and not on the basis of bilateral official relations. PBAT’s state visit should be understood against this background.
PBAT’s State Visit in Franco-Nigerian Ties
First, it is important to distinguish between the personal friendship between President Tinubu and President Macron which falls under officious international life, on the one hand, and the official ties between Nigeria and France, on the other. Even though PBAT signed agreements with France in the belief that they will be transactional in outcome, the definienda of the agreement are more sentimental in character. As reported by Deji Elumoye of ThisDay newspapers, PBAT said as follows: ‘it is a good time for all of us. I cannot be prouder than I am to be President of Nigeria at this challenging time. I have people who are very clearly inspired, who are determined to change the course of Africa by changing the rot of the past, blending a future that our children and grand children can hold, and be open, and be proud.’
More importantly, PBAT was quoted as further saying that ‘it is a great honour for me to be here. And it’s been a great day because you have arranged a great reception. Appreciating that you have a good knowledge of Nigeria is not enough. Your warmth, your commitment, and your foresight in Africa are remarkable. You stirred my excitement and caught my attention as a leader.’ This statement is most unfortunate, because it is precisely Macron’s presumed knowledge of Nigeria and Africa that has led to the complaints of the Francophones against France and the declaration of France as unwanted. Nigeria also myopically did not differentiate between ECOWAS regional interests and Nigeria’s strategic interest in Niger as falling within Nigeria’s foreign policy innermost concentric circle, and therefore warranting priority of protection. The neglect of this prompted the people of Niger to see Nigeria as another puppet of the West. Tinubu’s relationship with Macron is cordial and it is most welcome to the extent that it can be used to douse the tension between protesting Francophone Africans and France. Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali have served notice of their withdrawal from the ECOWAS with effect from January 1, 2025, thus making it, after Mauritania, four countries that have withdrawn from the ECOWAS. Have Nigeria’s foreign policy makers asked if President Macron is happy or not happy about this? Does Nigeria’s Tafawa Balewa House (New name of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) look at the implications of what PBAT told potential French investors, ‘easy in, easy out’? This is a dangerous and ambiguous statement with serious implications especially in terms of repatriation of profit, issues of double taxation, and abuse of the country’s rule of law.
Secondly, several media reports at home and abroad talk about PBAT’s 2-day and 3-day state visit. We argue here that it was more of a 2-day state visit than a 3-day state visit. It is the number of days of official engagement that is always reckoned with in international relations. The days of travel and reception at the hotel are secondary, even though the visiting President might have been officially received at the airport and have his hotel accommodation paid for by the host country.
It is true that PBAT travelled on Wednesday, 27 November to Paris. He was first received at the French Military Museum in Hotel National des Invalides in Paris on 28 November 2024 and thereafter at the Presidential Elysée Palace. But PBAT arrived in Paris on Wednesday evening at the Orly Airport at about 5.10 p.m. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Bayo Onanuga, Presidential Adviser on Information and Strategy, official engagement began on Thursday 28 November.
Additionally, many media reports talked about PBAT’s visit as ‘the first state visit by a Nigerian leader in more than two decades.’ This gives the impression that there had been, at least, a previous state visit by a Nigerian leader before the so-called ‘two decades ago.’ Chief Olusegun Obasanjo made 97 foreign trips as president of Nigeria while President Muhammadu Buhari (PMB) recorded 51 foreign trips. Of the 51 trips of PMB, none of the five trips to France was a State Visit. Others were either working, or ordinary official visit, and Private medical visits.
More interestingly enough, under President Obasanjo, a clear distinction was made between and among official visit, state visit, private visit, and official working visit. The only state visit he undertook was the state visit of October 10-13 1977 as military Head of State. The pariah status of Nigeria under General Sani Abacha did not allow for any state visit. Chief Ernest Shonekan’s tenure was too brief to allow for state visit. The same was true of General Abdulsalaam. What about Presidents Musa Yar’Adua and Goodluck Jonathan? They never visited France on state visit. Consequently, the issue of PBAT’s state visit is actually the first since 1960.
Thirdly, the act of visiting is an instrument of promoting better international relationships. When visits take place, issues of mutual interest are discussed and where disputes exist, the visit often provides an opportunity to find means of dousing any tension. In this regard, there are different levels of visit and there are also issues that cannot be easily ironed out at lower levels of officers. When visits take place at the highest level of the state, it clearly reflects the great importance attached to the issues to be addressed and the high level of involvement of government officials. Consequently, PBAT’s state visit can be rightly argued to have a seriousness of purpose.
Explained differently, at the level of bilateral relationships, there is the first level called bilateral partnerships or cooperation in which general objectives are articulated and public officials led by Ministers begin to articulate impediments to the growth and development of the relationship. Implementation modalities of existing agreements are discussed. Where there is the need to negotiate fresh agreements on issues of concern, they are also tackled and referred to appropriate higher levels of authority.
A follow up level is that of strategic partnership within the continuum of the cooperation. This level reflects the movement from generalities to specificities. Specified national and mutual interests are delineated. At this level, it is still the business of relevant Ministers, assisted by very senior government officials that drive the discussion. The third level of the cooperation is that of binational commission which is generally chaired by Vice-presidents. Specific working or follow-up committees are set up to monitor the execution of mandates agreed upon. The general and ultimate objective is always to prevent irritants in the relationship and ensure the reaping of gains of the relationship. The fourth and the crescendo of bilateral cooperation is the summitry level during which both leaders meet and co-chair the meetings. In this regard, all efforts so far made at the lower levels of discussion are further re-strategized, especially in terms of how best to further their shared interests.
In the context of PBAT’s state visit to Paris, Nigeria’s reported interests include the promotion of cooperation in the area of ‘agriculture, security, education, health, youth engagement, innovation, and energy transition.’ These areas of interest are also reported to be of interest to France, meaning that we can rightly talk about mutuality of interest.
Bedlam and Dilemma of the Relationship
While cooperation in the foregoing areas is desirable and falls generally at the level of strategic cooperation, the more critical area of mutual interest is not told: This is what is referred to as the bedlam and dilemma in the relationship. Put differently, France’s privileged and exclusive influence in Africa is on the decline in the continuum of global politics. France used to be the de facto representative and defender of Western interests in Africa, especially in Francophone Africa and following President Valéry Giscard D’Estaing’s proposal of a tripartite approach to relating with Africa. President D’Estaing wanted an Africa that would supply raw materials for the development of Europe; a Europe that would provide development funds to Africa, and a France, whose privileged ties with Francophone Africa was expected to be the coordinating country.
This strategy was proposed at the time of European Economic Community of Nine and Ten. Intra-European rivalry, and particularly Franco-American mutual suspicions, did not allow the suggestion to have meaningful effect. Besides, Nigeria’s foreign policy of non-acceptance of the use of African mineral resources for the development of Europe that is to the detriment of the development of Africa also largely undermined President D’Estaing’s strategy.
The situational reality as at today is beyond the explanation of the Libération newspaper which said that Presidents Macron and Tinubu ‘insistent sur l’importance de sécuriser le golfe de Guinée et d’éviter les influences étrangères dans leurs politiques respectives.’ Explained differently, both presidents ‘insist on the need to secure the Gulf of Guinea and to avoid foreign influences in their respective policies.’ Which are the foreign influences being referred to in this reported joint statement of France and Nigeria? Are they not implying China and Russia whose influence is on the ascendance?
While noting the need for Frensch investments in the cultural industries and flourishing businesses that can create gainful employments, as well as ensuring safety in the Gulf of Guinea, the newspaper says ‘nous sommes heureux que le Nigéria et la France soient des partenaires de confiance, l’un envers l’autre et à l’égard de nombreux pays du monde entier. Cette confiance n’a pas de prix. Elle écarte les contraintes et les pressions. Elles n’implique l’alignement systématique. Elle permet de s’affranchir des dépendances excessives. Elles nous incite à respecter la vision que chacun de nos deux pays a de son autonomie strategique. Nous définissons l’autonomie stratégique comme la capacité d’un Etat à defendre… ses intérets.’
This report speaks volumes and consciously responds to Nigeria’s foreign policy concerns. Translated, it says ‘we are happy that Nigeria and France are dependable partners, one trusting the other and towards the many countries of the world. This trust has no price. It sets aside constraints and pressures. It does not imply systematic alignment. It allows franchise for excessive dependences. They incite us to respond to the vision that each of our two countries has about its strategic autonomy. We define strategic autonomy as capacity of a state to defend its interests.’
The Libération newspaper is simply advocating the need for mutual trust in the relationship and not that the trust already exists. There has never been any mutual trust since 1960 but efforts are mutually and consciously made to make it look trustworthy. Consequently, the problem has little or nothing to do with alignment or on-alignment. Unless a new approach of citizen diplomacy, is factored into the relationship on a serious note Macron and Tinubu can continue to swim in a sea of dreams as the existential bedlam and dilemma in the relationship have become more critical.
Historiographically, relationship between Nigeria and France has generally been problematic because of the hostile foundations. First, as a result of France’s testing of her atomic bombs in the Reggane Area of the Sahara Desert in February and April 1960, which prompted Nigeria to warn France of a likely hostile reciprocal treatment on attainment of independence if France continued to disregard Nigeria’s protests made known through the then colonial master, the United Kingdom. And true enough, when Nigeria acceded to national sovereignty in October 1960 and France still launched a third test on 27 December 1960, the Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa administration declared the then French ambassador to Nigeria, Mr. Raymond Offroy, persona non-grata on January 5, 1961. He was given a manu militari treatment of 24 hours to leave Nigeria. He had to leave Lagos by road with his 9-man team to Cotonou in Dahomey, now Republic of Benin under inclement conditions.
The reported involvement of France in the killing of President Sylvanus Olympio of Togo in 1963 was another aspect of the foundational dilemma. It angered Nigeria to the extent that the Balewa government had to formulate an exception to the provision of Article 2(7) of the UN Charter which prohibits any intervention by Member States of the United Nations in the domestic affairs of other sovereign States. Nigeria, as argued by Dr Jaja Wachukwu, then Nigeria’s Foreign Minister, under no circumstance would the brutal killing of President Olympio, a considered very good friend of Nigeria, be considered as an internal problem of Togo, especially with the reported French complicity in the invasion of Togo by foreign mercenaries that led to the death of President Olympio.
In the same vein, Nigeria did not accept that the problem of apartheid and racial discrimination in Southern Africa was a domestic affair of South Africa. Nigeria saw the mistreatment of Black South Africans as an oppression of all Nigerians, in particular, and all other Africans, in general. Consequently, Nigeria formulated these two exceptions to Article 2(7) of the UN Charter.
Apart from this, when Nigeria applied to be an Associate Member of the European Economic Community within the framework of Articles 131-136 of the 1957 Rome Treaty, France frustrated the application by vetoing the ratification of the agreement in Lagos in 1966. Additionally, it is a truism to state that France worked against Nigeria’s national unity during Nigeria’s civil war. As explained by the then French Prime Minister, Michel Debré, if Biafrans could not be given accommodation in Nigeria, they should be allowed to have self-determination. This is why Nigeria’s relationship with France is not different from that between a rat and a cat. It is that of mutual suspicion and this has been a major dilemma since 1960. Today, the dilemma has deepened into a bedlam which is beyond what PBAT and President Macron are presenting to their different publics.
At the level of regional and sub-regional interests, France is particularly interested in securing Nigeria’s support in containing the growing Franco-African hostility towards France. It is the people, and not elected governments, that have developed animosity vis-à-vis France. After the ASS countries have strained ties with France and even withdrawn their membership of the ECOWAS, Chad also announced three days ago the termination of her defence cooperation agreement with France but without allowing the other areas of collaboration to be affected.
As reported by Paul Njie of the BBC News, Chadian Foreign Minister, Abderaman Koulamallah, said Chad’s decision did not mean a ‘break with France, like Niger or elsewhere,’ and that France was ‘an essential partner’ and however, Chad must ‘redefine its strategic partnerships according to national priorities.’ It is a matter of when France will also be declared unwanted in Chad. This cannot but be a pointer to another declining influence of France in the making. In the same vein, Senegal may soon kick out France in light of the directive of President Bassirou Diomaye Faye that French military bases in Senegal should be closed, purportedly in preparation of the 80th anniversary of the Thiaroye massacre. For which President Macron has accepted French responsibility.
Not less than 35 Senegalese were killed in 1944 during a protest against delayed payment of their entitlements. As noted by the Senegalese leader, ‘Senegal is an independent country, it is a sovereign country, and sovereignty does not accept the presence of military bases in a sovereign country.’ This statement shows that the problem is not for now but later.
Consequently, PBAT must not make the costly mistake of robbing the ASS countries to pay France. Sustaining Nigeria’s foreign policy of good neighbourliness and restoring better understanding with Francophone West Africa will be difficult. The bedlam and dilemma in Franco-Nigerian relationships cannot be easily removed without first reconciling the conflicting strategic approaches and placing greater emphasis on adoption of citizen diplomacy. France’s policy towards Nigeria is preventing Nigeria from being able to influence the Francophones, especially Nigeria’s immediate neighbours, against French interests. Nigeria does not also want France to use her privileged and preferential influence in Francophone Africa to her own detriment. Today, anti-French hostility in Francophone Africa has moved beyond the ASS countries to including Chad in Central Africa. Chadian Foreign Minister, Abderaman Koulemallah, said following the meeting of French Foreign Minister, Noel Barrot, with President Mahamat Déby, that Chad wants ‘to assert its full sovereignty’ by terminating its military cooperation agreement with France. Hence, France wants Nigeria as a possible mediator. The dilemma remains how PBAT, who is seen as a puppet, can support France against her immediate neighbours who want an end to foreign exploitation and re-colonisation. Nigeriens and Chadians are openly against France while Nigeria is courting France. PBAT should first address the conflicting policy attitudes.
- Prof Akinterinwa is former Director-General of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA)
