Foreign policy is an extension of domestic politics. It is what a nation projects to the outside world and, equally important, what it seeks to achieve internationally. No country conducts foreign policy in isolation from what is happening at home. Its economy, security, political stability, social cohesion and the competence of its leadership all shape what it can project abroad and what it can realistically achieve.
This is why Atiku Abubakar’s declared foreign policy plans deserve closer attention. He has said he would reopen Nigeria’s borders, would engage both ECOWAS and the Alliance of Sahel States, would work to bring the AES countries back into the ECOWAS fold, and would strengthen security cooperation with Nigeria’s immediate neighbours. Nigeria’s domestic challenges cannot be addressed without deliberate and intelligent engagement with the outside world.
The proposal to reopen Nigeria’s borders, for example, should not be viewed simply as a question of whether particular border posts are physically open or closed. The more important question is what Nigeria wants its borders to achieve. Nigeria is the dominant economic and demographic power in West Africa, yet its relationships with its immediate neighbours have increasingly been shaped by suspicion, restrictions and security concerns. A regional power cannot afford to treat its neighbours as peripheral to its national interest.
Trade, migration, food supply, security, cross-border communities and economic opportunities all connect Nigeria to the countries around it. Nigeria’s borders should therefore serve both security and economic objectives. They should protect the country without unnecessarily cutting it off from legitimate trade and the communities whose lives and livelihoods transcend political boundaries.
This approach fits within the concentric-circle principle coined Professor Ibrahim Gambari. Nigeria’s immediate neighbourhood should receive priority, followed by West Africa, Africa and then the wider international community. And the logic is straightforward. Nigeria’s security begins beyond its borders because threats do not respect immigration checkpoints, customs posts or political boundaries.
Atiku’s proposal to engage both ECOWAS and the AES therefore deserves serious consideration. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger withdrew from ECOWAS and that created one of the most serious fractures in the history of West African integration. Nigeria cannot afford to watch this development from Abuja as though it were someone else’s problem. Niger, in particular, is not a distant country with which Nigeria merely maintains diplomatic relations. It is Nigeria’s immediate neighbour, and developments there have direct implications for Nigeria’s security, particularly in the north.
The objective should not be to romanticise military governments or abandon Nigeria’s democratic principles or ECOWAS democratic norms. It should be to pursue Nigeria’s national interest. Diplomacy exists precisely because countries disagree. Nigeria must be able to engage governments with which it has serious differences without sacrificing its principles or interests.
If Atiku can help bring ECOWAS and the AES countries back to the negotiating table, that would be strategically more valuable to Nigeria than allowing West Africa to remain permanently divided. Regional leadership is not simply about issuing declarations. It requires persuasion, negotiation, patience and, where necessary, compromise in pursuit of the national interest.
This is also where Atiku’s foreign policy thinking appears to differ from the approach that has emerged under the Tinubu administration. During the 2022–2023 campaigns, Nigerians heard the slogan “Let’s dance,” while much of the responsibility for explaining the substance of his then potential administration was left to figures Malam Nasir El-Rufai.
If the economy is weak, Nigeria needs credible international partnerships. If insecurity is spreading, Nigeria needs the cooperation of its neighbours. If regional trade is disrupted, Nigeria needs diplomacy. If Nigeria’s influence in West Africa is declining, Abuja must rebuild its relationships.
This connection between domestic policy and international diplomacy is particularly relevant to Atiku’s experience in the Obasanjo administration. Atiku was not the head of Obasanjo’s Economic Management Team that secured the Paris Club debt relief. Atiku was nevertheless Vice President who chaired the National Economic Council and was an important member of the administration during a period in which Nigeria had to navigate a difficult economic and diplomatic process.
That experience matters because Nigeria may again require an administration capable of combining domestic economic reform with international diplomacy. The Paris Club debt relief was not secured through rhetoric. It required economic reforms, credibility, negotiation and sustained engagement with international partners. Nigeria eventually obtained substantial debt relief after paying about $12 billion in a deal that resulted in an $18 billion cancellation.
The same principle applies to security. Terrorism, weapons and criminal networks do not stop at the border. Nigeria therefore cannot secure itself effectively without meaningful cooperation with the countries around it.
Unfortunately, Nigeria’s position in West Africa has weakened since 2023. The confrontation between ECOWAS and the AES states has damaged regional integration, while the wider deterioration of relations between Nigeria and some of its neighbours has complicated efforts to address common security challenges. A divided West Africa and ECOWAS is not in Nigeria’s interest.
The Tinubu administration’s handling of the regional crisis, particularly the Niger crisis, contributed to this deterioration. Nigeria’s approach indirectly served French interests while weakening Nigeria’s own strategic position.
To repair this will require diplomacy and strategic patience. It will require Nigeria to persuade rather than try to dictate, and to negotiate rather than rely on pressure. Above all, it will require a clear understanding of what Nigeria wants from the region and what it is prepared to offer in return.
This is why Atiku’s foreign policy statements should neither be dismissed as campaign rhetoric nor accepted uncritically. Nigerians should demand specifics. How exactly would he reopen the borders? What security arrangements would accompany such a decision? How would he persuade the AES countries to reconsider their relationship with ECOWAS? What would Nigeria offer, and what would it demand, in those negotiations? How would his administration rebuild confidence in Nigeria’s leadership across West Africa?
The broader strategy appears to follow a logical progression. First, strengthen Nigeria at home, secure its immediate neighbourhood, rebuild West African integration, strengthen Nigeria’s role in Africa and then project Nigerian interests more confidently into the wider international system. The logic follow the philosophy behind his proposal to restored targeted fuel subsidy because they will have ripple effect over the economy.
Foreign policy should not be measured by the number of foreign leaders a president meets, the number of summits attended or the number of photographs taken at international events. The real test is what those relationships produce for Nigerians at home.
Can the Nigerian trader move legitimate goods across the border more easily? Can the Nigerian farmer produce without fearing armed groups operating across porous frontiers? Can Nigerian businesses access West African markets? Can Nigeria attract investment on better terms? Can Abuja negotiate from a position of strength with international creditors and development partners? Can Nigeria regain the influence necessary to shape events in its own region?
The challenge for Tinubu’s foreign policy, therefore, is not his foreign minister or lack of travel but the lack of strategic thinking. Atiku has already begun to demonstrate that expertise unlike the current president’s campaign of “let’s dance”.
