When President Bola Ahmed Tinubu assumed the chairmanship of the ECOWAS in July 2023, he inherited a regional organization already under immense strain. Years of democratic backsliding, economic fragility, and rising insurgency had weakened cohesion within the bloc. But what followed his appointment was not the restoration of order or leadership expected from Nigeria, the bloc’s traditional hegemon, but a period of profound diplomatic missteps that deepened ECOWAS fragmentation and severely undermined Nigeria’s geopolitical standing in West Africa.
Barely weeks into Tinubu’s tenure, Niger Republic fell to a military coup. Coming on the heels of similar takeovers in Mali and Burkina Faso, the coup in Niger represented a critical test of ECOWAS commitment to democratic governance. Yet, instead of crafting a pragmatic response rooted in both principle and regional sensitivity, the Tinubu-led ECOWAS veered toward a doctrinaire and aggressive reaction that exposed the President’s diplomatic inexperience and triggered long-term consequences for the bloc and for Nigeria.
ECOWAS had its Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance and this protocol has always been applied with caution. But Tinubu’s leadership adopted an approach largely shaped by the democratic peace theory, which posits that democracies are more stable, more peaceful in their foreign relations and do not go to war with other democracies. While such ideals are aspirational, their uncritical application in a region as politically diverse and fragile as West Africa proved disastrous. By focusing narrowly on democratic restoration in Niger through sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and threats of military intervention, Tinubu alienated not only the Nigerien junta but also the neighboring military governments in Mali and Burkina Faso. The three countries quickly announced their withdrawal from ECOWAS, and formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), a new regional bloc with a clear anti-ECOWAS posture.
This was not merely a political embarrassment. The geopolitical and security implications were immediate and severe. For over a decade, Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso had served as crucial buffer states, absorbing the brunt of jihadist insurgencies and serving as the forward line of defense against the spread of terrorism into coastal West Africa. Their security partnerships with Nigeria, Benin, and others had slowed the penetration of groups like ISWAP and other Al-Qaeda affiliates. With their exit from ECOWAS and the deliberate collapse of joint security frameworks, that shield disintegrated.
Nigeria, which shares the longest part of its border with Niger, has since witnessed a marked escalation in attacks, particularly in the North East. The MNJTF, a regional counter-terrorism coalition involving Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Benin, and Cameroon, also suffered a major blow with Niger’s withdrawal. Coordination has collapsed, joint patrols less frequent, and intelligence sharing became unreliable. Boko Haram and other insurgent factions exploit this security vacuum and reactivated old routes. This explains, partly, the renewed offensives in Borno State. The collapse of cooperation also allowed transnational smuggling of arms and fighters into Nigeria through our borders with Benin and Niger around Sokoto and Kebbi States, putting further strain on Nigeria’s already overstretched security forces.
Beyond military implications, the rupture revealed a deep philosophical miscalculation. Since its creation in 1975, ECOWAS has walked a delicate line between promoting regional norms and respect for national sovereignty. The Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance was never intended to override the foundational principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. Yet under Tinubu’s leadership, ECOWAS discarded this careful balance. His administration viewed the Niger crisis solely through the lens of democratic rectitude that may have a contagion effect in Nigeria, without regard for the practicalities of these military governments, the limitations of coercive diplomacy, and the necessity of regional consensus.
Diplomatic orthodoxy in West Africa has always demanded moderation, quiet backchannel negotiation, and the cultivation of internal legitimacy before projecting external influence. These tools were either misapplied or abandoned altogether. The rushed imposition of sanctions, the public sabre-rattling, and the failure to anticipate Mali and Burkina Faso’s alignment with Niger all point to a fundamental lack of strategic foresight. In choosing ideology over realism, Tinubu misread the room and the region. In doing so, he oversaw the unraveling of Nigeria’s most ambitious and enduring international project: ECOWAS.
What makes this failure more alarming is the historical precedent it threatens to repeat. The only Nigerian president whose ECOWAS legacy compares in terms of regional damage is Shehu Shagari, who in early 1983 expelled hundreds of thousands of Ghanaians under the infamous “Ghana Must Go” policy. That move, while domestically popular at the time, dealt a near-fatal blow to the fledgling protocol on the free movement of persons within ECOWAS. It took decades to rebuild trust and recommit to regional integration. Tinubu’s mismanagement of the Niger crisis not only squandered Nigeria’s hard-earned diplomatic capital but towers higher than Shagari’s “Ghana Must Go”.
To make matters worse, the recent efforts by Tinubu’s administration to reverse course by sending emissaries, floating the idea of phased reintegration, and engaging in tentative diplomatic overtures to the Sahelian states, only resembles too little, too late. In international relations, timing is not just important, it is everything. Diplomacy after the collapse of trust is not negotiation but damage control. The perception among many member states is that Nigeria, as Chairman, acted forced the intervention card on the table, without consultation, and now seeks reconciliation only after the damage has become visible.
This raises fundamental questions for Nigeria’s foreign policy architecture. Can a regional hegemon afford to pursue idealistic goals without anchoring them in the reality of diverse political regimes? Can democratic norms be enforced through coercion, or must they be cultivated through engagement and incentives? Should security cooperation be sacrificed on the altar of legitimacy, or must the two be pursued in tandem? The new ECOWAS Chairman, President Julius Maada Bio of Sierra Leone will have to contend with these questions in order to redeem ECOWAS.
Going forward, President Tinubu must reevaluate the assumptions underpinning his West African policy. ECOWAS must be reconstructed not merely as a union of democratic states, but as a practical coalition of willing partners with shared economic, security and social concerns. The vision of democracy must be married to the tools of reality. Sanctions must be targeted, incentives broadened, and diplomacy patient. No lasting regional order can be built on exclusion. The current reality demands compromise and strategic humility not ideological grandstanding.
It is unlikely that Nigeria will reclaim the ECOWAS chairmanship during Tinubu’s presidency. The damage has been done. What remains is a salvage operation, the slow work of trust-building and regional reintegration. This should be approached with less fanfare and more listening, less assertion and more empathy. The president must resist the temptation to pursue Nigeria’s foreign policy through force of personality. Instead, he must rebuild the foundations: mutual respect, regional solidarity, and a security doctrine grounded in shared survival.
The question is not whether Nigeria continues to lead West Africa. It is still the Big Brother and will remain so for obvious reasons. The deeper question is whether it has learned the lessons of this diplomatic collapse. Will Nigeria’s foreign policy under Tinubu mature from this moment so as to shed its presumptions and recase under the old realism that balances values with interests and vision with prudence?
President Tinubu still has time to pivot this. But since his ECOWAS tenure ended as it began, in confrontation and isolation, history is already not kind for a man who inherited Nigeria’s proudest diplomatic achievement and presided over its collapse in its safest zone! This is a tragedy both of vision and of leadership.
