West African regional integration is entering a critical phase. The resumption of dialogue between the ECOWAS and the AES states of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger raises important questions about sovereignty, geopolitics and the future of regional cooperation. Following their withdrawal from ECOWAS, effective 29 January 2025, the three Sahelian states established an alternative framework for regional cooperation. The ministerial-level dialogue between the ECOWAS and the AES in Dakar on 17 October 2026 nevertheless demonstrates that political separation has not eliminated the need for regional engagement.
This development highlights a fundamental paradox which indicates that states may withdraw from regional institutions, but they cannot easily withdraw from the geographical, economic, social and security relationships that bind them to their neighbours. The ECOWAS–AES relations therefore reveals that regional integration extends beyond formal membership. It is also shaped by complex interdependence, geopolitical interests, competing understandings of sovereignty and the evolving political identity of West Africa.
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye’s theory of complex interdependence provides a useful explanation. States interact through multiple channels, including trade, migration, diplomacy, security cooperation and institutional arrangements. Their interests are interconnected, making complete disengagement costly even when political relations deteriorate.
Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger may reject ECOWAS’ political authority, but their economic and geographical circumstances continue to connect them to the wider West African region. Access to coastal ports, regional markets, transport corridors and cross-border communities remains important to their economic survival. Likewise, insecurity in the Sahel cannot be isolated from developments in neighbouring coastal states. Armed violence, irregular migration, trafficking and other transnational challenges require forms of cooperation that national borders alone cannot provide.
It, then, goes without saying that institutional withdrawal does not necessarily terminate interdependence. Instead, it changes the conditions under which interdependence is managed. The emergence of the AES in parallel to ECOWAS demonstrates that states can reject a particular institutional arrangement while continuing to depend on the regional relationships it once coordinated. Interdependence, therefore, does not automatically produce political unity. It can also generate competing institutions, selective cooperation and strategic bargaining.
The geopolitical dimension makes this relationship more complex. The breakdown between ECOWAS and the three Sahelian states emerged amid disagreements over military takeovers, sanctions, political transitions and the legitimacy of regional intervention. At its core lies a contest over who defines legitimate political authority in West Africa and the extent to which regional institutions may constrain national governments.
ECOWAS has traditionally presented constitutional governance and regional rules as essential foundations of collective stability. The AES governments, by contrast, have emphasised sovereignty, political autonomy and resistance to external pressure. These competing positions reflect different understandings of regional order. For ECOWAS, integration requires adherence to established norms. For the AES, regional cooperation must not undermine the political independence of its constituent states.
Yet sovereignty does not necessarily mean freedom from dependence. The AES countries have sought to diversify their diplomatic and security partnerships, particularly beyond traditional Western relationships. Such diversification may expand their strategic options, but replacing one external relationship with another does not automatically produce autonomy. The more relevant question is whether these states can translate political independence into greater economic resilience, security capacity and meaningful control over their development.
This tension also invites a reconsideration of West Africa’s regional identity through the concepts of regionness and regionity. According to Bjorn Hettne and Fredrik Soderbaum, regionness describes the extent to which a geographical area develops into a coherent regional formation through shared interests, identities, institutions and political relationships.
West Africa possesses deep foundations for regionness. Historical connections, commercial networks, migration and cross-border communities existed long before contemporary regional institutions. These relationships cannot simply disappear because governments withdraw from an organisation. The Sahel and the coastal states remain connected through geography, economic exchange and shared social and security challenges.
Regionity, as used here, refers to the capacity of a regional formation to articulate and pursue a distinctive collective political project. The AES seeks to strengthen this capacity through common political declarations, security cooperation and confederal institutions. ECOWAS, meanwhile, retains an established institutional framework and a wider regional membership.
The emergence of these parallel projects does not necessarily mean that West Africa has ceased to exist as a region. Rather, it indicates a contest over how the region should be organised, governed and represented. The central question is whether competing institutional identities can coexist without undermining the practical relationships that connect West African societies.
Sovereignty lies at the heart of this contest. States understandably seek to preserve their political independence and freedom of decision-making. However, sovereignty exercised in isolation may offer limited protection against problems that cross national borders. Regional integration can constrain unilateral action, but it can also strengthen the capacity of states to address challenges they cannot manage effectively alone.
The dilemma is therefore not simply sovereignty versus integration. It is how states can preserve meaningful political autonomy while benefiting from collective action. Regional institutions must recognise that integration cannot be sustained through rules and enforcement alone. It also requires legitimacy, trust, consultation and a sense that common arrangements serve the interests of participating states.
For ECOWAS, this means examining how its principles of constitutional governance can be upheld while maintaining credible channels of dialogue with states that challenge its authority. Defending regional norms remains important, but the effectiveness of those norms also depends on their consistent application and the willingness of states to recognise the legitimacy of regional institutions. For the AES, the challenge is equally significant. Its assertion of sovereignty must translate into practical benefits for citizens rather than just institutional separation.
The renewed dialogue consequently offers an opportunity to distinguish political membership from functional cooperation. Even without an immediate return to ECOWAS, both sides have compelling reasons to maintain cooperation on trade, transport, migration and regional security. Practical agreements in these areas could reduce the costs of institutional fragmentation and preserve channels of communication despite continuing political differences.
Nevertheless, parallel institutions also create risks. Divergent rules, competing security arrangements and fragmented decision-making may increase the costs of cross-border activity and weaken collective responses to regional threats. The challenge is to develop mechanisms that preserve cooperation without requiring either side to abandon its institutional identity.
The ECOWAS–AES relationship demonstrates that regional integration is not a linear process in which states move inevitably towards greater unity. It is a political project continually negotiated through competing interests, ideas of sovereignty and changing geopolitical circumstances.
The future of West African integration will depend on whether ECOWAS and the AES can transform their continuing interdependence into workable arrangements for cooperation. Their dialogue should not be mistaken for proof of imminent reintegration, nor should their institutional separation be treated as evidence that regional fragmentation is irreversible. The more important question is whether West Africa can accommodate political differences without sacrificing the economic, social and security relationships that bind its peoples together.
Regional integration will, in the final analysis, endure not simply because states share a geographical space, but because they recognise that their collective interests cannot be secured entirely through separate national actions.
