In his response to my intervention on “Sheikh Masussuka and the Islamic Genealogy of Peace”, which he called “Beyond Theological Polemics” Muhammad Reza Sulaiman accused me of tendency to assess Masussuka through theological labels rather than carefully examining what he actually believes and practises. What he failed to take into consideration is the fact the totality of arguments put forward by Masussuka are theological arguments. Since his arguments cannot be completely divorced from their roots, exposing their theological roots and subjecting them to critical analysis is one of the best ways to understand interpretative limitations of lines of arguments advanced in defence of his positions. Masussuka had on several occasions claimed that he is a Quranist. At its core the term Quranist is a theological label because it defines a stance on epistemology, scriptural authority, and jurisprudence. By virtue of this, it is not academically objectionable to criticize Quranist interpretations by using the premises of Quranism itself. The significance of this lies in the fact that it allows for a rigorous examination of whether the approach fulfills its own claims of self-sufficiency, logical coherence, and ethical clarity without relying on external traditionalist assumptions.
More fundamentally, underrating the importance of theology in this conversation and taking a dim view of it, suggests a limited understanding of the centrality of theological contestations in the development of Islamic political thought. Theological contestation is not merely a background context to Islamic political thought; it is its primary foundational engine. In Islamic scheme of things, questions of statecraft, legitimacy, resistance, and governance were rarely articulated in purely secular or institutional terms. Rather, political authority was theorized through answerability to the Shari’ah, the nature of God’s justice, and the definition of true belief. In essence, theological contestations provided the epistemological categories and moral arguments through which political power was asserted, contested, and restrained.
More specifically, the earliest theological schools in Islam emerged directly out of early political disputes, particularly the First and Second civil wars and the question of leadership following the assassination of the third Caliph, Uthman ibn Affan and the Battle of Siffin. The Kharijites who rejected both the Fourth Caliph, Ali ibn Abu-Talib and Mua’wiya ibn Abu-Sufyan, formulated an unyielding political-theological position that authority belongs solely to Allah. They argued that a ruler who commits a major sins apostatizes and people must rebel against him. This established the earliest model of conditional legitimacy and active rebellion grounded in moral perfection. In sharp contrast to Kharijite radicalism, the Murji’ah developed the doctrine of Irja’ or postponing judgement of human sin to Allah on the Day of Judgement.
Politically, this served as an argument for civic obedience and preservation of the state in that as long as a ruler professed faith, his tyrannical or unjust actions did not invalidate his rule or justify civil war. The Sunni-Shi’i schism began as a political disagreement over succession but rapidly developed into deep theological contestation. The significance of theological contestation lies in the simple fact it guarded against the possibility of Islamic political thought to become a static, monolithically defined system. By constantly questioning the nature of justice, authority, and Islamic law, theological debates open the space for Muslims to continuously re-negotiate the relationship between power, morality and state.
In a bid to justify Masussuka’s position on Hadith literature my interlocutor claimed that Masussuka was not the first Muslim scholar in Nigeria to question particular Hadith reports as Sheikh Abubakar Mahmud Gumi had done that before him. Comparing Gumi’s attitude toward Hadith literature to that of Masussuka is akin to comparing apple with mango. It is an exercise in futility as the two cases are of doubtful comparability by all counts. Such a farfetched claim cannot withstand any rigorous scrutiny for a number of reasons. First, there is no ideological or methodological affinity between Sheikh Abubakar Mahmud Gumi’s attitude toward Hadith literature and that of Masussuka. To be sure, they both rejected certain post-formative religious practices but their underlying theology, methodology, and legal sources regarding Hadith stand at opposite ends of the Islamic intellectual spectrum. Gumi viewed Hadith as the essential primary source equal to the Qur’an in authority for drawing Islamic law and creed.
Much the same cannot be said about Masussuka who rejected entirely or reduced Hadith to mere historical context and viewed the Qur’an as the only source of divine guidance. Second, when it comes to the authority of the Prophet (SAW) Gumi believed that prophetic tradition or Sunnah provides binding divine clarification of Qur’anic commands. Conversely, Masussuka as a Quranist denied the legal binding authority of Hadiths, and attributed them to later human fabrications. The methodological goal of Gumi entails return to the vision of the first three generations of Islam or the Salaf (al-Salaf al-Salih) guided by the Qur’an and authentic Sunnah.
Much the same can never be said about Masussuka who bypassed all canonical Hadith collections to interpret the Qur’an strictly through itself. In essence, Masussuka arrogated power to interpret the Qur’an and reduced the Prophet to a mere postman who delivered the Book of God and then disappeared. He failed to recognize the fact that the Prophet (SAW) had founded a community, established a state, and spent every moment of his prophethood in guiding, directing and leading his followers. His life example of living by God’s guidance, consisting of whatever he did or said or approved is Sunnah. Unfortunately, Masussuka and his ilk brushed aside all this. The entire reform project of Sheikh Gumi was premised on strictly adhering to authentic Hadiths. The defining feature of his preaching and teaching activities had been citing classical canonical collections such as Sahih al-Bukhari, Sahih Muslim and many others to justify religious obligations, administrative ethics and daily rituals. Undoubtedly, this is in sharp contrast to Masussuka who explicitly rejected the canonical Hadith collections as unnecessary, unreliable or blasphemous additions to Islam. What is clear from foregoing overview is that Gumi’s objection was not against Hadith per se, but against unauthenticated traditions, weak Hadiths or innovations that lacked explicit support from canonical Hadith literature.
While Masussuka initially rejected Hadith literature in its entirety as an unauthorized post-Qur’anic addition and described the whole corpus of Islamic jurisprudence as fiction (tatsuniya). Under pressure from the mainstream scholars he decided to change his track and argued that he only rejected Hadith that contradict the Qur’an, denigrates the Prophet or encourages violence. This is rather an afterthought that failed to deter him from rejecting Hadith which met the conditions he laid down. For instance, he rejected Hadith on intercession which has nothing to do with contravention of the Qur’an, encouraging violence or denigration of the Prophet. He categorically declared that he did not believe in the idea of intercession. Belief in the Prophet’s intercession on the Day of Judgement is an established tenet of faith grounded in both the Qur’an and Hadith. Indeed, mainstream Sunni and Shia scholars generally view the rejection of the Prophet’s intercession as diminution of his God-given status, even if the person rejecting it claims he is doing so our of reverence to divine justice or Oneness of God. Comparing Sheikh Gumi’s attitude toward Hadith with that of Masussuka is nothing less than a deliberate, mischievous attempt to mischaracterize Gumi’s teaching and preaching activities pure and simple.
The interlocutor views my decision to ignore his railing and unsubstantiated allegations against Lawal Abubakar Triumph as a sign of inability to give the honour and sanctity of the Prophet the seriousness and sensitivity it deserves. It appears he has an axe to grind with that Salafi scholar. After all, he is well aware of the fact that Lawal Triumph was invited by the Shura Council in order to defend himself against allegations made against him which he did. It is interesting to note that, nine issues were raised in the petition, but only four specific issues with verifiable evidence were selected for deliberation. He defended himself on each of these allegations by citing multiple Islamic texts to buttress his arguments. In sharp contrast to Masussuka, books are available to verify Lawal Triumph’s claims. Blindly supporting false accusations against another person out of sheer hate and prejudice is far from protecting the honour and sanctity of the Prophet of Islam. True respect for the Prophet means accepting what he brought, not redefining his role based on human logic as Masussuka is fond of doing. As for Sheikh Muhammad Kabiru Gombe’s challenges, Masussuka had failed woefully to answer any of the questions. Instead of doing the needful he decided to answer Gombe’s questions with another set of 100 questions. This a clear testimony to intellectual vacuity that marks Masussuka’s online debate with the mainstream Sunni scholars.
Little wonder, when he was challenged to come out for an open debate he deliberately refused. Avoiding meaningful, constructive intellectual engagement with other scholars can never serve as a pathway for enriching the conversation about Islam in Nigeria. More to the point, bringing unsubstantiated allegations can neither establish the accuracy of your assessment of Masussuka’s teaching and preaching activities nor prove the truth of his theological and ideological positions, let alone create space to diagnose problems and generate solutions. This explains why the way you bring unexamined personal biases and prejudices against Salafi-oriented groups into the analytical process converts the analysis into ideological-cum-religious sophistry rather than political analysis.
Thanks God, you have freely admitted that you had followed the teaching of Masussuka on two occasions. Following Masussuka’s teaching on social media on only two occasions is generally insufficient to establish a comprehensive or reliable understanding of his ideological and theological positions. There is an important distinction between being exposed to Masussuka’s ideas and being properly acquainted with his ideological and theological orientations. Mere exposure does not necessarily imply comprehensive knowledge.
Consequently, exposure cannot provide sufficient grounds for understanding his broader intellectual commitment, theological orientation, or ideological position. Another problem is that of selective character of social media content, which opens space for selective exposure. For instance, a scholar may discuss a particular religious issue, respond to a controversy, or address a specific audience. Such presentation may not adequately represent his broader intellectual worldview. The whole import of your admission is shallow and impressionistic smattering of knowledge of Masussuka for following him on two occasions only cannot allow fruitful engagement with his teaching activities across different subjects and contexts. From an academic perspective drawing conclusions about Masussuka’s ideological and theological identity from only two social media appearances raises questions about the adequacy of evidence, representativeness, and validity of the assessment. The corollary of relying on impressionistic understanding is to directly violate the core methodological standards that distinguish political science as a systematic academic discipline from partisan advocacy. An argument which is based exclusively on unverified personal impressions and superficial observation easily collapses when subjected to counter-examples.
More to the point, failure to suspend prior assumptions undermines objectivity and falsifiability, which serve as the bedrock of scientific epistemology as formulated by Karl Popper and adapted across social science. Failure to admit mistakes and accept constructive criticisms cannot serve as an effective pathway when it comes to advancing scientific knowledge in political science.
The admission that you had followed the teaching of Masussuka at least on two occasions also presupposes that the assessment of his contributions to peace building and interfaith harmony was done in the absence of facts. To be sure, following the teaching of Masussuka on social media on two occasions may provide some exposure to his religious ideas but it not constitute sufficient grounds for reaching a conclusion on his ideological and theological orientations. Reaching such a conclusion requires sustained engagement with his intellectual contributions, consistency of his arguments, doctrinal commitments and broader scholarly engagement. What falls short of such a sustained engagement risks confusing limited exposure with substantive intellectual understanding. A smattering of Masussuka’s contribution to advocacy of peace and interreligious harmony cannot serve as substitute for an informed understanding his intellectual identity. The problem with your claim that prioritizing peace advocacy and interfaith harmony is the defining feature of Masussuka’s teaching and preaching activities is failure to take into account the fact that Masussuka’s interfaith engagement is at the expense of inter-Muslim relations.
Certainly, Islamic intellectual traditions can greatly contribute to peace building and interfaith harmony in contemporary Africa, but not in the provocative way Masussuka went about doing it. For one thing, on several occasions almost on a daily basis, Masussuka engaged in provocative act of addressing, describing or referring to Muslim scholars who disagree with him through derogatory, insulting, offensive or demeaning labels capable of being perceived as an attack on their character, dignity, identity, intelligence, moral standing, or social status. The persistent use of foul language against those who disagree with him suggests the idea of verbal aggression through which he communicates contempt, hostility, ridicule or disrespect toward other Muslims. Even though it does not involve physical contact or application of force, it constitutes an attack on their psychological and emotional wellbeing. The problem with persistent use of contemptuous language against other people lies in its capacity to create space for normalizing discrimination and fostering conditions in which physical aggression assumes the character of socially acceptable way of resolving disputes. The case of Burundi readily comes to mind.
For another, it amounts to travesty of the highest order to smuggle in extraneous matters to Quranist theology and methodology in support of claim that Masussuka prioritized peace advocacy and interfaith harmony. No amount of sophistry can justify assessing the contribution of Masussuka on the basis of what falls outside the intellectual and theological framework of Quranism. Doing so, after all, risks committing a methodological error and producing an unfair assessment. Quranism, broadly understood places the Qur’an at the centre of religious authority and rejects, questions or declines to recognize the normative authority of both Hadith literature and Fiqh or Islamic jurisprudence.
For instance, the First Hijra to Abyssinia is one of the historical events used in illustrating Masussuka’s contribution to peace building and interreligious peaceful coexistence. Unfortunately, the historical details of the First Hijra to Abyssinia were built on evidentiary authority that Quranism flatly rejects. Hence, it cannot be used to illustrate contribution of a diehard Quranist such as Masussuka who argued that is better for a Muslim to take a lesson in game of chance than to take lesson in Hadith and Fiqh. By virtue of this, it is glaringly unfair to attribute to him what is clearly outside the purview of Quranism. There is no denying the fact that the First Hijra to Abyssinia provides the best example of peaceful migration, mutual respect, and strategic alliances across religious lines, but it falls outside the realm of acceptability as far as Masussuka is concerned. This is because the whole idea of the First Hijra was based on historical details which are extraneous to Quranism that guides and informs his theological and ideological engagement. Much the same can be said about the so-called Meccan blueprint, which has much closer affinity with Taha’s idea of Second Message than Quranism.
Given the Quranist identity of Masussuka, it is completely out of point to associate him with the Suwarian tradition. Any claim that suggests any form of affinity between Suwarian tradition and Quranist theology and methodology of Masussuka has no even an iota of credibility. On no occasion had Al-Hajj Salim Suwari rejected Hadith or mainstream Sunni legal methodology. The question he addressed has nothing to do with Quranism. What he addressed is the question of how minority Muslim merchant populations could live, trade, and practise their Islamic faith under non-Muslim ruling majority. In response to this question he formulated the Suwarian tradition in the late 15th century West Africa. Hence, projecting Suwarian tradition onto Quranism of Masussuka amounts to anachronism of the highest order. Unlike Quranists, Suwari was not in any way addressing 19th-20th century debates over modernist textual criticism and authenticity of Hadith chains of narration. Beyond chronological timing, equating the two mischaracterize how traditions operate internally.
On the one hand, Salim Suwari was a devout scholar of mainstream Sunni Islam and the Maliki School of jurisprudence. He relied heavily on classical Sunni legal tools such as public interest, precedent and secondary rulings to argue for non-aggression and non-proselytization. Suwarians had never rejected Sunnah or Fiqh; they simply derived a quietist co-existential framework out of existing Sunni law. On the other hand, Quranists explicitly reject Hadith and Fiqh. The core identity of Quranism, therefore, is the rejection of Hadith and post-Qur’anic jurisprudence as authoritative divine sources. For a Quranist like Masussuka, relying on Maliki legal manuals as the Suwarians did, is inherently flawed. What is clear from all this is that: Suwarians reached tolerance through traditional Sunni jurisprudence adapted to minority social dynamics while Quranists reach tolerance through literal and exclusive reliance on the Qur’anic text.
The whole essence of my intervention is to draw attention to the danger of conjecture and misinformation on which you built your assessment of Masussuka. Whenever an important issue of national concern is assessed in the absence of relevant facts, the danger of conjecture and misinformation lurks in the background waiting for opportunity to manifest itself. Such a danger shows itself in at least five ways. First is misrepresenting the circumstances surrounding the issue. Second is promoting misinformation and unsubstantiated claims. Third is reinforcing existing prejudices and stereotypes. Fourth is drawing conclusions that are disproportionate to the available evidence. Fifth is influencing public opinions in ways that undermine informed democratic deliberation. When it comes to assessing an issue of national importance doing the needful entails distinguishing between established facts, verifiable evidence, reasonable inferences, and unsubstantiated allegations or personal opinions and ideological preferences.
Of what intellectual or practical value is an assessment of Masussuka’s contributions to peace building and interfaith harmony when it is not sufficiently grounded in verifiable facts? Public commentary on matters of national importance should not be reduced to conjecture, ideological predispositions, or uncritical expression of personal sentiments. To be sure, differences in interpretation are spices of public discourse, therefore, completely legitimate and even desirable in a democratic setting like Nigeria, but such differences must be grounded in an identifiable body of evidence. Anything less than doing the needful opens space for what passes for assessment to risk becoming an exercise in speculation rather than a meaningful contribution to informed public discourse. This sums up the crux of my argument: failure to admit mistakes and accept constructive criticisms cannot serve as an effective pathway when it comes to advancing useful knowledge in political science or in any of its different subfields.
- Muhammad hails from Jega
