At the midpoint of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s tenure, Nigeria’s foreign policy in West Africa finds itself at a troubling crossroads. Once a bulwark of regional stability and principled diplomacy, Nigeria is now perceived as a divisive actor under a leader who appears more concerned with the optics of power than the realities of leadership. This shift has profound implications, not just for Nigeria’s role in West Africa, but also for its long-cherished foreign policy ideals.
To understand the gravity of the current trajectory, one must begin with the conceptual foundation of Nigeria’s foreign policy. The idea of “concentric circles,” coined by Professor Ibrahim Gambari, a former Nigerian foreign minister, posits that Nigeria’s foreign engagements should prioritize immediate neighbors, followed by West Africa, Africa, and then the wider world. This strategy is rooted in geographical logic, economic interdependence, and security imperatives.
Under this framework, Nigeria’s immediate neighbors, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and Benin, should occupy the first circle. These states are vital for Nigeria’s national security, trade, and regional diplomacy. The second circle, West Africa, is where Nigeria exercises its leadership most visibly, particularly through ECOWAS. Traditionally, Nigeria has played the role of regional stabilizer, peacekeeper, and economic engine in this space.
From Gowon to Jonathan, Nigeria maintained a consistent role as West Africa’s regional stabilizer, peacekeeper, and economic anchor. Under Gowon, Nigeria used its petrodollars to contain regional conflicts and established a foundation for soft power diplomacy. This approach matured under Murtala and Obasanjo, whose assertive foreign policy gave Nigeria a central place in continental affairs. Obasanjo’s “native diplomacy” with Seyni Kountché helped institutionalize Nigeria-Niger relations to exemplify a blend of cultural affinity and geopolitical calculation.
President Shagari’s diplomatic restraint during the Bakassi Peninsula crisis further demonstrated Nigeria’s preference for dialogue over conflict. Babangida expanded Nigeria’s reach by leading peacekeeping and peace-enforcement efforts in Liberia which positioned Nigeria as a regional power broker. Abacha extended this legacy into Sierra Leone to reinforce Nigeria’s status as both a military and diplomatic force.
Under Abacha and later in the post-military era under Obasanjo, Nigeria restored constitutional governments in Sierra Leone and São Tomé. Yaradua pursued silent diplomacy in Niger and Guinea, that quietly restired constitutional order. Jonathan’s decisive involvement in Mali reaffirmed Nigeria’s capacity for strategic regional leadership.
With this rich legacy of proactive diplomacy and regional stewardship, President Tinubu’s apparent retreat from such engagement is perplexing. It invites serious reflection on the erosion of Nigeria’s longstanding influence in West Africa.
President Tinubu, in his first months in office, adopted the posture of a democratic crusader in stark irony to Nigeria’s own faltering democratic credentials. Nowhere was this ego-driven stance more visible than in his response to the July 2023 coup in Niger Republic. Rather than engage in quiet diplomacy, Tinubu led ECOWAS to the brink of war under the guise of restoring democratic order.
This was a radical departure from Nigeria’s traditional foreign policy, which upholds non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states. It is worth noting that during Nigeria’s civil war (1967-1970), Niger was one of the very few neighbors that provided critical support to Nigeria, rejecting French entreaties to back Biafra. This historical memory could have served as a foundation for rational and empathetic diplomacy. A simple phone call to former Head of State General Yakubu Gowon, the only surviving architect of Nigeria’s early foreign policy and of ECOWAS, could have offered institutional memory and wise counsel. Instead, Tinubu allowed ideology and ego to guide statecraft.
By pushing ECOWAS to threaten to activate the military option under the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, Tinubu shattered the trust that had underpinned West African cooperation for decades. Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali, already alienated by what they perceived as ECOWAS hypocrisy and neo-colonial posturing, responded by withdrawing from the bloc and forming the Alliance of Sahel States. This was a diplomatic earthquake.
Nigeria has been the linchpin of ECOWAS, investing blood, resources, and credibility into its success. The departure of three member states and the subsequent death knell to any future regional cohesion should be considered a monumental failure of leadership. This is not just a blow to regional diplomacy; it is the undoing of a 50-year legacy.
One must ask: why was Nigeria so intent on military intervention in Niger? Was it truly about democracy, or was ECOWAS, under Tinubu’s leadership, acting as a proxy for French strategic interests? France, increasingly unpopular in the Sahel due to its perceived neo-colonial attitudes and military failures, stood to benefit from a regional coalition pushing back against the anti-French governments in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso.
Nigeria’s willingness to align with this agenda despite the region’s growing anti-French sentiment alienated traditional allies and put Nigerian troops at risk. This alignment with foreign interests over regional sensitivities has permanently damaged Nigeria’s credibility as a sovereign and independent voice in African diplomacy.
The vacuum left by ECOWAS and Nigeria’s missteps has been quickly filled. The AES states have not sat idle. They have actively forged new partnerships with Russia, which provides them with military and counterterrorism support, and Morocco, which offers them access to Atlantic trade routes through its southern provinces.
The economic implications are dire for Nigeria and ECOWAS states. These states, for instance, have begun diverting trade routes away from Nigerian and other ports in the region. Morocco’s Atlantic gateway presents an alternative that could significantly undercut Nigeria’s dominance in regional trade logistics. Nigeria, self-styled as “giant of Africa,” now finds itself sidelined in strategic regional developments.
In attempting to “save democracy,” President Tinubu has unwittingly destroyed ECOWAS and weakened Nigeria’s influence more than any previous administration.
The recklessness of Tinubu’s West African policy mirrors his domestic governance. At home, his economic policies have plunged millions into poverty. Fuel subsidy removal, Naira devaluation, and indiscriminate borrowing have wreaked havoc on households and small businesses. Ironically, the administration that criticized Buhari’s profligacy has far exceeded it in borrowing, raising questions about financial stewardship.
The pain of the common Nigerian has been met with tone-deaf rhetoric from a government seemingly more concerned with prestige projects and elite patronage than public welfare. The president’s foreign policy posturing, then, can be seen not as a strategy but as a distraction and an attempt to build a legacy abroad while presiding over domestic decay.
Real leaders build consensus; they do not break institutions. They preserve legacies; they do not erase history. President Tinubu’s foreign policy in West Africa, anchored more in ambition than principle, has left Nigeria weakened and adrift.
And so, the question must be asked: what is the endgame? Is it a secure, stable West Africa where Nigeria leads by example? Or a fragmented region where Nigeria is mistrusted and sidelined? To President Tinubu, his Foreign Affairs Minister, and the Nigerian elite: what has Nigeria gained from alienating its closest neighbors? Was it worth destroying ECOWAS to assert authority that no one in the region recognizes anymore? And to the Nigerians, are we comfortable with this vision of leadership, abroad and at home?
