Nigeria’s foreign policy under President Bola Ahmed Tinubu has been nothing short of a catastrophic failure, particularly in its handling of ECOWAS. Once regarded as Nigeria’s most significant and enduring foreign policy project, ECOWAS has been carelessly dismantled under Tinubu’s leadership, largely due to his personal ego masquerading as a commitment to enforcing regional norms on democracy and good governance. This failure is not just a blow to Nigeria’s regional influence but also a betrayal of the principles enshrined in the Nigerian Constitution, which mandates the promotion of African integration and unity. The disintegration of ECOWAS, the rise of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), and Nigeria’s declining influence in West Africa underscore the rudderless nature of Tinubu’s foreign policy.
ECOWAS, established in 1975, has been the cornerstone of Nigeria’s foreign policy for decades. It was designed to foster economic integration, political stability, and collective security in West Africa. Nigeria, as the region’s largest economy and most populous nation, has historically played a leadership role in the organization. However, from 2023 to date, this legacy has been squandered. Tinubu’s approach to the political crises in Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso—countries now part of the AES—was heavy-handed and counterproductive. His insistence on enforcing the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, while ostensibly noble, was executed with such rigidity, lack of tact and diplomatic finesse that it pushed key regional actors.
The intervention of General Yakubu Gowon, Nigeria’s former head of state and one of the founding fathers of ECOWAS, exemplifies the extent of Tinubu’s missteps. Gowon, recognizing the dire consequences of Tinubu’s approach, attempted to mediate and advise the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government. His counsel, rooted in decades of experience and a deep understanding of regional dynamics, fell on deaf ears. Tinubu’s refusal to heed this advice was not just a rejection of wisdom but a clear indication of his prioritization of personal ego over national and regional interests. The result has been the formal exit from ECOWAS by Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso last week.
The formation of the AES marks a significant shift in the geopolitical landscape of West Africa. These nations, rich in natural resources such as gold, uranium, and oil, have long been strategic partners for Nigeria. However, Tinubu’s foreign policy failures have pushed them into the arms of alternative allies, most notably Russia. In the emerging multipolar world order, Russia has been keen to expand its influence in Africa, and the AES provides a perfect opportunity. The Sahelian nations have already begun receiving technical partnerships and technology transfers from Russia, albeit on a modest scale. This collaboration is likely to grow, further marginalizing Nigeria and ECOWAS in the region.
The AES represents more than just a political realignment; it is a rejection of Nigeria’s leadership and the principles ECOWAS was supposed to uphold. By prioritizing rapprochement with France—a former colonial power with a controversial history in Africa—Tinubu has alienated the very nations Nigeria should be leading. This misstep is particularly egregious given the Nigerian Constitution’s explicit mandate to promote African integration and unity. Instead of advancing these goals, Tinubu’s foreign policy has undermined them.
In stark contrast to Nigeria’s failures, Ghana’s President John Mahama has demonstrated a pragmatic and forward-thinking approach to foreign policy. Recognizing the shifting dynamics in West Africa, Mahama has prioritized constructive engagement with the AES by appointing an envoy. This is a clear signal of Ghana’s commitment to advancing its national interests without alienating key regional players. This balanced approach stands in sharp contrast to Tinubu’s rigid and self-defeating policies.
The current state of Nigeria’s foreign policy under Tinubu can only be described as rudderless. The foreign minister, tasked with advancing Nigeria’s interests abroad, has been reduced to defending the president’s domestic policies in media interviews. This is a gross misallocation of energy and a clear indication of the government’s misplaced priorities. The role of the foreign minister is to engage with the international community, not to serve as a mouthpiece for domestic propaganda. The minister should leave this for Mr Daniel Bwala.
To address this crisis, Nigeria must rewind its foreign policy institutional memory. A roundtable involving past foreign ministers and ambassadors to ECOWAS states could provide valuable insights and solutions. These seasoned diplomats, with their wealth of experience and knowledge, could help chart a new course for Nigeria’s foreign policy that can restore Nigeria’s standing in the region. However, such an initiative requires humility and a willingness to listen—qualities that have been conspicuously absent in Tinubu’s leadership.
The disintegration of ECOWAS and the rise of the AES are not just regional tragedies; they are indictments of Tinubu’s foreign policy. His failure to heed the advice of predecessors like General Gowon, his prioritization of personal ego over national interest, and his flawed rapprochement with France have all contributed to this debacle. Nigeria’s foreign policy is in dire need of a course correction, one that prioritizes African integration and unity as enshrined in the Constitution.
Ghana’s pragmatic approach offers a valuable lesson in diplomacy and adaptability. Nigeria must learn from this example and engage constructively with both traditional and emerging powers in the region. The solution to Nigeria’s foreign policy crisis lies not in the current administration’s defensive posturing but in a return to the principles and practices that once made Nigeria a leader in West Africa. Only by doing so can Nigeria hope to regain its lost influence and restore its standing in the region.
